Like Bitcoin, Zcash uses a public ledger that anyone can see. The difference is shielded transactions. A shielded transaction encrypts the sender, the recipient and the amount, and leaves only a zero-knowledge proof on the ledger saying “this transaction followed the rules”.
What gets hidden
Even for the same 1.25 ZEC transfer, the information left on the ledger is completely different depending on whether it is a transparent or a shielded transaction.
The ledger only records a proof that this is a valid transaction that followed the rules. Only the recipient can decrypt the contents.
How is it different from Bitcoin?
Zcash is closer to a sibling that branched off from Bitcoin. The skeleton is the same, and on top of it you can think of one more encrypted ledger, the shielded pool.
What is the same
A proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain that started from the Bitcoin Core code
Supply cap of 21 million coins, with a halving about every 4 years
Transparent addresses (t1…) work like Bitcoin addresses, with UTXOs and scripts
Bitcoin: the flow stays connected
A0.5 BTCB0.3 BTCC
Addresses and amounts are public, so you can follow the transactions to trace who sent to whom.
Zcash shielded: the link breaks inside the pool
A?🔒 Shielded pool??
Notes inside the pool are all encrypted, so from the outside you cannot connect when the funds that went in came out and to whom.
Item
Bitcoin
Zcash
What the ledger shows
Addresses and amounts of every transaction are public
Transparent transactions are public; shielded transactions encrypt addresses, amounts and memos
How balances are recorded
Public UTXOs (address + amount)
Transparent UTXOs + encrypted shielded notes
Double-spend prevention
Anyone can see which UTXOs were spent
Shielded spends are checked by nullifier duplicate detection. Which note was spent is not revealed
Transaction validation
Signatures and scripts are executed publicly
Shielded transactions are validated by verifying a zero-knowledge proof (Halo 2)
Chain analysis
Easy to cluster addresses and trace fund flows
Inside the shielded pool, links between transfers are broken
Privacy tools
Optional techniques outside the protocol, such as CoinJoin and Lightning
Shielded pools built into the protocol
Memos
Only public data such as OP_RETURN
Each shielded transaction carries a 512-byte encrypted memo that only the recipient can read
Selective disclosure
Not possible (everything is already public)
Share history only with chosen people using a viewing key
Supply verification
Sum all UTXOs
Sum transparent UTXOs + each pool's turnstile balance
Mining algorithm
SHA-256
Equihash
Block interval
About 10 minutes
25 seconds (since NU7 in Nov 2026; previously 75)
If you are a Bitcoin user: Zcash transparent addresses are public, just like Bitcoin. Zcash's own privacy comes when you make shielded transactions with a shielded wallet.
How is it different from other privacy technologies?
The word ‘privacy’ is the same, but what is hidden and who you have to trust differ. Zcash and Monero build privacy into the currency itself, mixers and Privacy Pools are apps on Ethereum that break the link between deposits and withdrawals, and Aztec is an L2 that does private computation.
Form
What it hides
Default
Crowd you hide in (anonymity set)
Trusted setup
Selective disclosure
Zcash (shielded)
Currency (ZEC) on its own chain
Sender, recipient, amount, memo
Optional. When shielded wallets are used with each other
All notes in the same shielded pool
None for Orchard and Ironwood (Halo 2)
Users choose whom to share a viewing key with
Monero
Currency (XMR) on its own chain
Sender, recipient, amount
Default for every transaction
16-member ring signature (1 real + 15 decoys)
None
View key (mainly for incoming transactions)
Mixers such as Tornado Cash
App on Ethereum
The link between deposit and withdrawal
Optional. Only when used
Deposits in the same fixed-amount pool
Yes (a ceremony per circuit)
No built-in mechanism. Deposit and withdrawal addresses and times are public
Privacy Pools
App on Ethereum and other chains
Deposit-withdrawal link; from v2, the parties and amounts of transfers inside the pool
Optional. Only when used
The set of approved deposits
Yes (a ceremony per circuit)
The operator (ASP) screens deposits and approves or revokes them
Aztec
Ethereum L2 (alpha)
State and calls that an app makes private
Public or private chosen per function
Users of private state
Yes (universal SRS)
Depends on app design
Monero
The biggest difference is that every transaction is private by default. In exchange, the sender hides among 15 decoys. It is preparing the FCMP++ upgrade, which makes every output on the chain a candidate, and as of November 2026 it is not yet activated. Some large exchanges have delisted Monero.
Tornado Cash and mixers
You put in a fixed amount (for example 1 ETH) and take it out to a different address, so the amount and the deposit and withdrawal addresses and times remain visible. It was sanctioned by the US in 2022, and after an appeals court ruling in November 2024 the sanctions were lifted in March 2025.
Privacy Pools
A regulation-friendly design in which an operator maintains a list of ‘clean deposits’ and only funds on that list can be used privately. It launched on Ethereum in March 2025, and in October 2026 v2 began hiding transfers inside the pool as well.
Aztec
An L2 that runs private smart contracts on top of Ethereum. Alpha V6 was released in November 2026, but the official docs say the software has not yet finished auditing.
The Zcash shielded pool has weaknesses too. Shielding is optional, so many transactions are still transparent, and amounts are revealed when moving between pools (Sapling, Orchard, Ironwood). This summary is as of November 2026; each project changes quickly, so check the sources too.
4 building blocks
A shielded transaction works through four mechanisms that fit together. Think of an “encrypted note” taking the place of Bitcoin’s “public balance piece (UTXO)”.
01
Note
The unit of 'money' in a shielded pool. It is a small record holding an amount and recipient information, encrypted so that only the recipient can open it, and posted to the chain.
02
Note Commitment
A 'sealed fingerprint' that reveals nothing about the note's contents. All commitments are stacked into one Merkle tree, and when you spend a note you only prove that 'my note is somewhere in this tree'.
03
Nullifier
When a note is spent, a unique value computed only from that note is published. If the same nullifier appears twice it is rejected, which stops double spending, but it is never linked to which note was spent.
04
Zero-knowledge proof (zk-SNARK)
It proves 'I did not overspend my balance, I used a note that is really mine, and the amounts add up' without revealing any of the details. Orchard and Ironwood use the Halo 2 proof system, which needs no trusted setup.
Commitment tree and anchor
Nodes append the note commitments carried in each new block, in order, to one Merkle tree. A block carries only the new commitments, not the whole tree; each node keeps computing the tree in its own database. The value at the top of the tree (the root) is a fingerprint of ‘all notes created so far’.
Anchor
A transaction that spends a note picks the tree root at one point in time as its reference. This root is called the anchor. An anchor only points to the state of the tree; it does not say which note is involved.
Merkle path
The wallet holds the path from your note up to the root (depth 32 for an Orchard-style tree). Inside the proof it shows only that ‘my note is somewhere in the tree of this anchor’ and does not reveal the path itself. So the candidates for the sender are all notes that had accumulated in that pool up to the anchor.
Separate per pool
Sapling, Orchard and Ironwood each have their own commitment tree and nullifier set. Ironwood started this tree and set from scratch, uses a quantum-recoverable note format, and lets Orchard funds enter only through the turnstile so that the supply can be verified again.
Encrypted memo
Every shielded output (note) comes with a 512-byte memo field. The memo is encrypted together with the note, stays on the chain permanently, and is read along with it when the recipient's wallet opens the note.
Who can read it
The recipient, the sender if they kept a copy with their outgoing viewing key when sending, and anyone given a viewing key that can see that history. A third party cannot even tell whether a memo was written, because the 512-byte field is filled the same way even when the memo is empty.
What it holds
Usually text, but it can also hold data agreed between apps (ZIP 302). It is used to write information you deliberately want the recipient to have, such as an invoice number or a reply address.
A memo is only encrypted, not erased, and it does not authenticate the sender. Anyone can write any name in a memo, and if you hand over a viewing key, that person can read the memo too.
How a shielded transfer works
Receive
The sender creates a new note for the recipient's address and encrypts it so that only the recipient can open it. The note commitment is added to the commitment tree.
Find
A shielded output does not contain the recipient's address. So the wallet tries to open each shielded output in a new block with its own incoming viewing key, one by one (trial decryption). Most attempts fail, and the ones that open are your notes. Light wallets do this using compact blocks (ZIP 307), which carry only the commitment, the ephemeral public key and the first 52 bytes of the ciphertext for each output. This is why 'syncing' a shielded wallet takes a while.
Select
The wallet picks enough of your notes to cover the amount to send plus the fee. A note cannot be split, so it is spent whole, and the leftover comes back as a new note to yourself (change). For example, to send 5 ZEC using a 3 ZEC note and a 4 ZEC note, a 5 ZEC note for the recipient and a change note for you, minus the fee, are created.
Spend
When spending a note, the wallet builds a zero-knowledge proof that 'this note is in the tree, I own it, and the amounts add up', and publishes the nullifier.
Verify
Nodes only check that the proof is valid and that the nullifier has not been seen before. They cannot tell who sent how much to whom.
Action: pairing a spend slot with an output slot
An Ironwood transaction carries notes in a unit called an Action, inherited from Orchard. Each Action has one ‘spent note’ slot and one ‘created note’ slot. If the number of spent and created notes differ, the empty slot is filled with a zero-amount dummy to make a pair.
What is hidden
How many notes were spent and how many were created. A transaction that spent 2 notes to send 1 and one that spent 1 note to create 2 both look like 2 Actions.
What is visible
The number of Actions and the fee. The fee is set by the number of Actions (ZIP 317), so the rough size of a transaction is revealed.
The two slots paired inside one Action do not mean ‘this note went to that note’. Whether the amounts add up is checked across the whole transaction. In the earlier Sapling, spent and created notes were carried separately, so a wallet had to fill in dummies itself to hide the counts. After NU6.3, the Orchard pool can pair only within the same address, which weakened this hiding effect.
What is visible by transaction type
Type
Direction
What the ledger shows
Disclosure level
Transparent → transparent
t → t
Sender address, recipient address and amount are all public
Public
Shielding
t → z
The transparent address and the amount going in are public; later movement inside the shielded pool is hidden
Partial
Fully shielded
z → z
Sender, recipient, amount and memo are all hidden
Private
Deshielding
z → t
The receiving transparent address and the amount coming out are public; the source is hidden
Partial
Three ways to move between pools
ZEC is one coin but is split across the transparent pool and several shielded pools. When you cross a pool boundary, the net amount crossing is made public.
Transparent → shielded
Shielding
Moves ZEC from a transparent address into a shielded pool. The amount that crossed and the transparent-side address are visible, but the newly created shielded note is private.
Shielded → transparent
Deshielding
Takes funds from a shielded pool out to a transparent address. The amount taken out and the receiving transparent address are public. Exchange deposits are the typical case.
Shielded → shielded
Migration
Moves funds between shielded pools, such as from Orchard to Ironwood. Addresses are not revealed, but the net amount crossing the pool boundary is public in the transaction, and it goes through a turnstile check that the pool balance does not go negative.
Address types
t1… / t3…
Transparent address
A Bitcoin-style public address. Balance and history are fully visible.
zs1…
Sapling address
An address for the Sapling shielded pool from 2018.
u1…
Unified Address
One address that bundles several kinds of receiving addresses (ZIP 316). The sending wallet picks the most private route it supports. It is the default address in today's shielded wallets, and one wallet can create many of them.
tex1…
TEX address
An address for exchanges that accepts only funds coming from a transparent source (ZIP 320).
Viewing keys: show only to those who need to see
Shielded does not mean “nobody can see” but “only the people I choose can see”. If you share a viewing key, you can show your history without handing over the authority to spend. It is used for situations such as tax filing, accounting audits and an organization disclosing donations.
Incoming viewing key (IVK)
Lets you see only incoming transactions and memos. It is also the key a wallet uses to find your notes. It suits disclosing the amount raised at a donation address.
Outgoing viewing key (OVK)
A key for reopening outputs you sent earlier to check how much you sent to whom. Whether to leave a copy that this key can open when sending is up to the wallet.
Full viewing key (FVK)
Contains both the incoming and outgoing viewing keys. Incoming transactions and whether your notes were spent are always visible, and how much you sent to whom is visible if a copy for the outgoing viewing key was left when sending. It has no spending authority.
Spending key
The only key that can spend funds. It is derived from the seed phrase and must never be shared.
Full viewing key
Derived from the spending key in one direction only. You cannot recover the spending key from a viewing key.
They split off again from the full viewing key, and addresses are derived on the incoming side. Even if you give someone your address, they cannot see your wallet history.
Example: Zodl added Unified Viewing Key (UVK) export in September 2026. Related news →
Supply is verified even when amounts are hidden
Hiding amounts raises the question, “couldn’t someone secretly print coins without anyone knowing?” Zcash has a turnstile that publicly tracks the total amount going into and out of each pool. No pool can pay out more than was legitimately paid in, so anyone can check that the total supply is correct just by adding up each pool's balance.
This is also why Ironwood started as a new pool in 2026. The Orchard counterfeiting vulnerability was of a kind that could not be detected cryptographically even if it had been exploited, so Orchard funds can move to Ironwood only through the turnstile, making the soundness of the supply verifiable again. Ironwood proposal summary →
Shielded pool history
Sprout
The first shielded pool, launched with Zcash. Proofs were heavy and a trusted setup was required. It can no longer receive new funds.
Sapling
An upgrade that cut proving time sharply and made mobile shielded wallets possible. It was still based on a trusted setup.
Orchard (NU5)
Introduced the Halo 2 proof system, which needs no trusted setup, and Unified Addresses.
Orchard counterfeiting vulnerability fix
A soundness flaw was found in the Orchard circuit and fixed in early June through an emergency soft fork and NU6.2. There was no known exploitation and no effect on user privacy. Read more →
Ironwood (NU6.3)
A new shielded pool started fresh with the fixed circuit. It reuses Orchard's Actions and Halo 2 but has its own commitment tree and nullifier set, and its notes are designed to be quantum-recoverable. After this, new shielded transfers go only into Ironwood, and Orchard allows withdrawals only. Read more →
Looking ahead: Shielded Labs' Epoch project is researching post-quantum cryptography (news), and Project Tachyon is working on improving the scalability of shielded transactions by changing how nullifiers are managed.
Usage habits that protect privacy
No matter how strong the cryptography is, information can still leak through how you use it.
Send shielded to shielded
When shielded wallets that support Ironwood send to each other, every detail of the transfer is hidden. Shielded wallet list →
Vary amounts and timing at the boundary
If you shield 1.234 ZEC and deshield 1.234 ZEC right after, the two can be linked by amount and time even though the contents are encrypted.
Give each counterparty a different address
If you give the same shielded address to several parties, they can compare notes and tell it is the same address, even though the chain does not show it. It is better to create a new address for each.
Do not reuse transparent addresses
Even when you need a transparent address, such as for exchange deposits and withdrawals, reusing the same one piles your history up in one place.
Remember that exchange records remain
The leg where you send to or receive from an exchange is linked through transparent addresses and identity verification data. After receiving, move the funds to a shielded wallet.
Mind the network level too
Light wallets connect to a server, so your IP address may be exposed. If your wallet offers an option such as Tor, it is better to turn it on.
The recipient reads the memo
A memo is encrypted against third parties but fully visible to the recipient. Do not write more personal information than necessary.
Limits and common myths
“All Zcash transactions are anonymous”
No. Transactions between transparent addresses are fully public, like Bitcoin. Privacy comes when you use shielded transactions.
“Nothing is visible in a shielded transaction”
The fee, the time the transaction was included in a block and the rough transaction size are visible. What is hidden is 'who sent how much to whom'.
“It's a privacy coin, so you can't trust the supply”
Thanks to the turnstile, which publicly tracks inflows and outflows for each pool, anyone can verify the total supply.
“Shielded transactions are suspicious”
Like HTTPS on the internet, shielding is a protection that should be the default. That is why recent wallets use shielded by default.
Common debates
Claims that often come up outside the community. Some were true in the past but have since changed.
“There was a premine”
There was neither a premine nor an ICO. Anyone could mine from block 0 on October 28, 2016, and the first 20,000 blocks were a ‘slow start’ period in which the reward increased gradually. The controversy comes from the Founders' Reward. For the first four years, 20% of block rewards went to the founders, early investors, employees, ECC and the Zcash Foundation, totaling 10% of the whole supply (about 2.1 million ZEC). This was a rule published in the protocol from the start, and it ended at the first halving in November 2020. History of development funding →
“Developers take 20% of the mining reward”
Not anymore. It is true that the 20% is not the miners' share, but since November 2024 no development organization receives block rewards directly. Today the 20% is split into 8% for Community Grants (ZCG) and 12% for a fund whose use is decided by a coinholder vote, and this structure lasts until the 3rd halving (around November 2028). What happens after that is being discussed on the forum. Details →
“The Zcash Foundation (or ECC) controls Zcash”
It is not a structure that one organization can change. Nodes are built separately by the Zcash Foundation (Zebra) and Valar Group (Zakura), and protocol changes are proposed as ZIPs and go through the community panel and coinholder sentiment polls. An example is ZSA, which 70.4% of the community panel (ZCAP) supported in the February 2026 poll but was postponed after 98.6% of coinholders opposed it. The ECC development team that first built Zcash became independent in January 2026 and founded ZODL, and the Ironwood and NU7 upgrades continued normally afterward. How decisions are made →
“The trusted setup creates a counterfeiting risk”
Sprout (2016, 6 participants) and Sapling (2018, an additional ceremony on top of the Powers of Tau with 87 contributors) went through ceremonies in which many people jointly generate the secret values, and it is safe as long as even one participant is honest. From Orchard in 2022, Halo 2 is used, so there is no trusted setup at all, and Ironwood is the same. Even if an old pool were broken, the turnstile protects each pool's balance, so the total supply cannot be secretly inflated. However, ‘no trusted setup’ does not mean ‘no bugs’. In May 2026 a soundness bug was found in the Orchard circuit and fixed with an emergency upgrade, and there was no sign of exploitation. What happened →
“The shielded pool is small, so the anonymity set is small”
As of Nov 20, 2026, the shielded pools hold about 4.93M ZEC, which is 28.9% of mined ZEC, and 4.18M ZEC of that is in Ironwood. The candidates for the sender of a shielded transaction are not a handful of chosen decoys but every note in the same pool. However, what determines the size of the set is the number of notes, not the amount, and right now the pool is split because funds are moving from Orchard to Ironwood. Shielded pool charts →
“Monero, where every transaction is private, is always more private”
Being private by default is a clear strength of Monero. Because private transactions are not a small minority, none of them stands out. On the other hand, Monero's sender candidates number 16 per transaction (1 real + 15 decoys), and past research showed that weaknesses in decoy selection let a significant share of inputs be traced (this has since been greatly improved). Monero is preparing FCMP++, which makes the entire chain the candidate set, but it is not yet activated. Zcash's weakness is that shielding is optional. If you mix it with transparent addresses, transactions can be linked by amount and time, and transactions where every input and output is shielded were 33.6% of all transactions in October 2026 (a high figure that includes Ironwood migration transactions). Rather than one being better, it depends on what you want to hide and how you use it.
“Selective disclosure (viewing keys) is a backdoor”
A viewing key is not a key the protocol hands to someone. It is a read-only key that the user creates and gives only to people they choose. It has no spending authority, and if you do not hand it over, nobody can see anything. It is a tool to show only the needed scope when needed, such as for an accounting audit or tax filing. Viewing keys →