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Several zcashd and Zebra vulnerabilities fixed

Node crashes, consensus mismatches between the two implementations and a way to defeat turnstile accounting were found and patched. It said there was no exploitation on the consensus chain and funds and privacy were safe.

The ZODL blog disclosed that several vulnerabilities were found and patched in zcashd and Zebra. They include a bug that could crash a node with a particular Orchard transaction, a difference in consensus enforcement between the two implementations that could cause a chain fork, a bug that could defeat zcashd's turnstile accounting, and an integer overflow in the pool balance calculation. It said none were exploited on the consensus chain, user funds and privacy are safe, and none could inflate the ZEC supply.

The affected versions are zcashd v5.0.0 through v6.12.0 and Zebra v1.0.0 through v4.3.0, and the fixed versions are v6.12.1 and v4.3.1 respectively. Researcher Alex Sol reported them to Shielded Labs on April 4, and engineers at ZODL and the Zcash Foundation built the patches and coordinated their rollout before disclosure. Mining pools with a supermajority of hashrate and Foundry, which uses Zebra for mining, applied the patches before disclosure. The two releases were made public on April 17.

A panic when building the proof instance while the Orchard re-randomized key rk is the identity was a crash vulnerability present since v5.0.0. For an identity epk, Zebra rejects it while zcashd does not check, creating a chain-fork risk. Both issues were fixed by rejecting the identity encoding of rk and epk in the transaction pre-verification stage, and there were no such transactions on mainnet. The specification is to be updated to match the implementations.

The bug introduced in zcashd v5.10.0 was that receiving a block header already seen would overwrite the pool balance with nullopt, which could switch off later turnstile checks. Duplicate block notifications are normal P2P behavior, so this could happen routinely or through a malicious peer. This bug alone cannot create or steal ZEC; it would need a separate balance vulnerability, and violations are publicly observable. It was fixed by moving where the function is called, and an NU6.1 checkpoint and delta recomputation were added so that a mismatch aborts at startup and requires a reindex.

In zcashd's pool balance accumulation, a crafted block could cause a signed integer overflow (undefined behavior). Daira-Emma Hopwood hardened it by adding a MoneyDeltaRange range check and exception handling. This is the second disclosure in a month, and it described the same researcher reporting again through the coordinated route as a desirable pattern. It said some of the analysis and fixes were assisted by Claude Opus 4.6 and reviewed by humans.

This summary is based on the original; check the original for exact details.