← All insights
RESEARCHShielded Labs

Four questions about the Orchard vulnerability

It separately explains whether it was exploited, whether Orchard funds can be recovered, supply verification and whether other forgery vulnerabilities may exist. It sees past exploitation as unlikely but cannot be fully ruled out.

Jason McGee and Zooko Wilcox of Shielded Labs explained what the Orchard vulnerability means for users in four questions. The piece comes from the concern that different issues were mixed together in the discussion, making it hard to understand. The questions are: Was the vulnerability exploited? Can legitimate Orchard funds be recovered? Can it be verified that the supply was not inflated? Are there no other forgery vulnerabilities?

On whether it was exploited, they said it cannot be known but is unlikely. It was not found despite years of close review; after discovery, the ZODL team coordinated with mining pools to temporarily freeze the Orchard pool and deploy a fix, reducing the attack window; and an attacker who wanted to cash out counterfeit ZEC would have to pass through the turnstile, and no evidence has appeared so far. If there was no exploitation, all legitimate funds are recoverable. Conversely, if there was forgery, the turnstile limits total withdrawals, so some users might not be able to recover their funds.

Cautious users can move funds out of Orchard, but it carries risk. Moving to a transparent address publishes the amount and timing and links them to that address. Moving to Sapling reveals the amount and timing but does not link them to an address, and relies on the 2018 trusted setup. The piece assesses this risk as moderate and says keeping funds in a shielded self-custody wallet is also reasonable.

On supply verification, they acknowledged it is not possible today. If the proposed upgrade seals the Orchard pool, blocking new inflows and circulation within the pool and allowing only withdrawals through the existing turnstile, node operators can verify that circulation beyond the correct supply is impossible, regardless of whether there was forgery. No other forgery vulnerabilities have been identified yet, and several teams are reviewing, even using AI tools, and additional assurance with the Tachyon project is also being prepared.

This summary is based on the original; check the original for exact details.