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Coinholder voting chain design published

It explains the structure of the voting chain: one Ironwood ZEC is one vote, snapshot balances are proven privately, and votes are homomorphically encrypted and tallied by an MPC committee.

Valar Group published the design of the Coinholder Voting Chain on the forum. The chain was recently used for the NU7 coinholder vote, and is also said to be planned for use in the vote before the security incident. A voting round consists of a snapshot height, an end time and several proposals, and one Ironwood ZEC at the time of the snapshot is one vote. Transparent-address voters are handled as before.

Voters privately snapshot their Zcash mainnet balance and prove it to the voting chain, and this process is not linked to mainnet notes. The vote amount for each proposal is submitted homomorphically encrypted to the MPC committee, and after the round ends the committee submits partial decryptions and correctness proofs and sums them. The wallet creates three stages of proofs (Snapshot, Vote Commitment, Reveal ZKP), and amounts are split into 16 pieces and submitted at different times through multiple submission servers to prevent timing linkage.

The governance structure has two axes. A coordinator multisig coordinates creating voting rounds and approving validators, and the current design is a 2-of-5 made up of representatives of Project Tachyon, the Zcash Foundation, Zodl, Shielded Labs and Valar Group. The election authority is a set of at least 10 validator nodes that create per-round keys through distributed key generation (DKG) and decrypt with a 2/3 threshold. Both sets are configuration values not fixed in the protocol, and questions go through at least five days of public review.

A notable technical element is the nullifier exclusion proof, which shows that a note was not spent at the snapshot time. Because the full Orchard data is 2GB and hard to download on mobile, the system looks up Merkle paths without exposing nullifiers by using a sorted Merkle tree and Private Information Retrieval (PIR). This method was audited by Zellic. The trust model table summarizes that no one can break the unlinkability between a vote and an identity, and that the coordinator only decides which questions are posted and cannot see individual votes.

The design aims for openness and reuse, so that anyone can launch a vote, any wallet can display it, and anyone can run the chain or audit the results. How to run validators, audit tallies, run your own chain and operate a PIR server, along with code such as vote-sdk, voting-circuits and zcash_voting, is published. The author thanked those who reviewed the design, the node operators who took part in the test round, and the Vizor and Zodl teams who worked on wallet integration.

This summary is based on the original; check the original for exact details.